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I  Introduction  
 
This paper is a study in failure. The post war world in Britain produced a left 
intellectual opposition, a group that appeared to have a substantial following 
among young and politically active individuals.  Yet this weighty collection of 
men and women failed to have a substantive influence on public policy, most 
especially in the second half of the period under study.  Indeed, so weak has 
been the long term sway of the radical left within the British Labour Party that 
by the early years of the new century, the Labour-led British government has 
often found itself to the right of even conservative and Christian Democratic 
regimes in the European Union on social and economic issues.  By contrast, 
Anthony Crosland was the most influential voice on economic and social 
matters in the Labour Party for much of the post war period, though his 
writings lack a detailed and rigorous analysis of the state of the British 
economy and society. Perhaps the influence of the politically perspicacious 
Anthony Crosland is only to be expected.  But how do we account for the utter 
political failure of the left intellectual opposition? 
 
This turn of events is a remarkable one.  As Andrew Glyn and Bob Sutcliffe 
pointed out in their British Capitalism, Workers and the Profits Squeeze 
(1972), Britain emerged from the Second World War in the unique position 
among large nations in Europe of having a working class undecimated by the 
War and post war reconstruction1.  Its intellectual class was equally privileged. 
There was no counterpart in the Cold War period to the McCarthyist purges in 
the US; compared to left wing intellectuals in, most especially France and 
Italy, British left intellectuals were relatively untarnished by association with a 
Communist Party that was at the centre of political life or, in the case of 
Germany, an association with a Soviet-dominated regime in the east. Left 
intellectuals in Britain had none of these difficulties, yet as a group they 
emerged with less direct influence in political life than in any of these other 
countries.  
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While comparisons of the failure and decline of the influence of left 
intellectuals in Britain with those in other countries will prove a fruitful line of 
inquiry, the singular aspects of the British case among large nations makes it 
of especial interest: in contrast to the US, the radical left’s standing apart from 
political involvement was, to some extent, voluntary – an act of strategy. 
Furthermore, the precipitous decline of left intellectual influence in recent 
years is not, as on the Continent, linked in any straightforward way to a 
previous linkage with communism.  The British case is a relatively ‘pure’ one, 
in which the obvious proximate explanations for the decline of left intellectual 
influence – repression in the case of the US and communist linkage in the 
case of the Continent – are relatively weak.  Britain may thus be a good 
laboratory for examining the general decline of the intellectual left in the 
Western world. Even with the relative absence of the proximate causes for the 
decline of left intellectual influence, the British intellectual left is exceptional for 
its complete powerlessness in recent years.  The factors that have generated 
this weakness and decline in Britain may help clarify the causes of the decline 
of the left in the Western world in general. 
 
There are other reasons for a special focus on the intellectual left in Britain.   
One is the exceptionally high quality of the work produced by these 
individuals.  In the disciplines of history, politics and economics, a fair 
proportion of the major contributions to these fields, even in the minds of 
mainstream practitioners, emanated from left intellectuals (history: Christopher 
Hill, Eric Hobsbaum, E.P. Thompson; politics: Ralph Miliband and Perry 
Anderson; economics: Bob Sutcliffe, Andrew Glyn, Bob Rowthorn).  The 
indubitable intellectual eminence of the left opposition, the members of which 
listed above are only a small sample, merely re-enforces the paradox of the 
lack of influence of this group on the broader political environment.   
 
The approach taken here may be viewed as a tentative effort to disinter the 
cognitive aspects of political and economic programmes. Can these 
programmes be linked to an underlying intellectual structure, and can the 
success or failure of these programmes be accounted for by their inherent 
intellectual validity?  Following Keynes2, we focus here on the role of ideas: 
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what were the intellectual foundations of the approaches taken by the left 
opposition to key issues of public policy?  
 
In earlier work, we posed the following question: what could possibly have 
motivated the seemingly irrational decisions of the Soviet government in the 
late 1920s to proceed with the rapid amalgamation and nationalisation of the 
whole industrial sector and the simultaneous collectivisation of agriculture, 
involving, most extraordinarily, the shelling of Ukrainian villages with artillery?   
These decisions, we concluded, were motivated in large part by rational, if 
mistaken notions on how best to facilitate economic development in the Soviet 
Union, based on a long and well-developed intellectual tradition on the nature 
of capitalist development3.  As we shall see, residual aspects of this tradition 
were still to be found in the left wing of the Labour Party, as well as in the left 
intellectual opposition. 
 
The emphasis on ideas taken here is not designed to suggest that political 
and social movements can be fully explained by their underlying intellectual 
structures, or that weaknesses in those structures fully account for the 
success or failure of these political movements.  But to relegate historical 
explanation purely to the personal and political conjunctures of the moment 
(e.g. the personality of Stalin) is to reduce history to narrative, while a crudely 
materialist approach suggests an historical fatalism in which human agency 
and decision-making is of no consequence. By contrast, analysis of the 
cognitive basis of decision making may yield something approaching a 
satisfying explanation for past events.  Thus, the Soviet programme of rapid 
economic development was linked to the internal dynamics of the Soviet 
Communist Party and other factors, but the specific forms this policy of 
development took ( forced collectivisation; gigantic industrial structures) were 
largely a consequence of the particular intellectual tradition from which the 
programme emerged.  Furthermore, this cognitive approach can also help 
explain the failure of the Soviet programme: it failed at least in part because 
the ideas upon which it was based were flawed, and not merely because 
these policies were carried out in an incompetent, inhumane and 
undemocratic manner. 
 5 
 
Here I put forth the hypothesis that the failure of the left intellectual opposition 
to have a major impact on British political and economic life in the post war 
world is largely due to underlying weaknesses in its conceptual framework 
rather than to inadequacies in political tactics. Much of the economic analysis 
was objectively incorrect and the policy prescriptions inoperative.  The broad-
based rejection of left policies by the public was based on an intuitive grasp of 
these inadequacies, rather than any explicit `turning to the right’ of the 
population. A complementary, if uncomfortable conclusion, as we shall see 
below, is that there were elements in the approach of their opponents, i.e. the 
Crosland ‘revisionist’ wing of the Labour Party as well of that of the Thatcher 
regime which were better suited to the objective realities of the times than the 
approach of the left intellectual opposition.  
 
We focus here on economic issues. The failure of radical economists to make 
a substantive historical imprint on economic debates in the post war world has 
compelled a somewhat artificial focus on a specific historical moment: the 
response of our group to the Alternative Economic Strategy (AES) of the 
Labour Party from the mid 1970s to the early years of the Thatcher 
government.   Two obvious objections to the approach taken here must be 
considered.  First, as noted above, the radical left’s standing apart from 
political involvement was, to some extent, voluntary – an act of strategy.  We 
shall see that the economic analysis of many radicals had substantial points of 
conjuncture with that of the Labour Party AES. However, involvement with the 
Labour Party in the period under consideration was sufficient to destroy a 
proponent’s radical credentials, and attempts to create new political groupings 
of a radical kind (e.g. the Socialist Society of the early 1980s) were manifestly 
unsuccessful. Thus, it could be argued that to explain the failure of radical 
intellectuals to be of political influence risks falling into tautology, since the 
radical left by definition has been linked to its political incapacity.   
 
Secondly, one may question the central tenant of the research here, which is 
that the intellectual left in Britain has had little influence.  As Jonathan Israel 
has emphasised in his recent book The Radical Enlightenment (2002), the 
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influence of Spinoza and his followers was pervasive in Europe in the years 
following Spinoza’s death even when explicit reference to the man and his 
doctrines was considered outside the bounds of legitimate philosophical and 
political discourse.  So too, it could be argued, the influence of radical left 
intellectuals was manifest in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, the 
women’s movement and other key issues of the post war world, and is still to 
be seen in the daily reporting of the Guardian and even the Financial Times, 
as well as the reports to be seen on ITV and the BBC.   
 
The above objections have important elements of validity, but the ultimate 
collapse of all left economic strategies, whether emanating from inside the 
Labour Party or not, signals deeper weaknesses than can be accounted for 
merely by failures in political strategy.  And whatever the continuing influence 
of left intellectuals on the daily life of journalists, schoolteachers and others in 
fields such as history and politics, the substantive fact of overwhelming 
significance is that the policies pursued by the present-day Labour Party of 
Britain are the most conservative of any left party in western Europe.  The 
radical left opposition has thus failed in Britain and it is most explicitly in the 
realm of economic ideas where it has suffered its most decisive intellectual 
failure.  This is a fact of critical significance, since the realities of economic life 
and the contest over economic ideas remain important arenas for determining 
the trajectory of social and political developments.  The failure of the left 
intellectual opposition in this domain is thus central to understanding its 
overall failure.   
 
 
II The Alternative Economic Strategy: Policies for Regeneration  
 
The Labour Party took a dramatic turn to the left in 1973 with the adoption of 
its Alternative Economic Strategy (AES) (the name was given in 1975), 
rejecting the  ‘revisionist’ political economy epitomised by the Crosland-
inspired 1957 party document Industry and Society.  The AES was 
eventually put to one side by the Labour Party in 1983. The six key elements 
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of the AES were commitments to reflation, public ownership, planning, price 
controls, industrial democracy and import restrictions.4   
 
The first four of these aspects of the programme were meant to be part of a 
co-ordinated effort to deal with deficiencies of the economy at both a macro 
and microeconomic level.  Thus, policies of reflation  (increases in aggregate 
demand to promote investment, employment and economic growth), in the 
absence of changes in the micro economy, would continue to fail: they would 
inevitably become part of the notorious ‘stop-go’ cycles that had brought other 
periods of expansion to a halt. Structural changes in the micro economy were 
needed so that upswings in business activity were not constrained by 
bottlenecks in the supply of capital goods resulting from deficient investment, 
and by inflation resulting from monopolies taking advantage of favourable 
demand conditions to raise their prices inordinately.  
 
Firms were to be brought under public ownership (‘a significant public stake in 
each sector of the economy’), involving at least two dozen leading companies.  
It was unclear, and perhaps intentionally so, whether this nationalisation 
would include foreign-owned firms. Nationalised firms would set standards for 
the rest of the business sector.  First, they would undertake high levels of 
investment, using funds that these firms, prior to nationalisation might have 
devoted to dividend payouts and to taking over other firms.  Secondly, they 
would have to show restraint in the setting of prices, most especially since the 
firms nationalised were likely to be near monopolies or dominant firms in one 
or more sectors of the economy.  Price restraint by the nationalised firm would 
help create a competitive atmosphere for the rest of the firms in the sector. 
Furthermore, this restraint in the setting of prices would be coupled with the 
pursuit of employment policies designed to give a favourable Phillips curve 
trade-off between employment and inflation.  
 
Planning agreements and price controls would reinforce these standards for 
the top 100 companies left in private ownership.  Targets would be negotiated 
with firms concerning covering employment, investment, and production over 
a five year period, covering pricing policy, product development, marketing, 
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and export and import levels.  Generalised price controls were not so much an 
inherent part of the overall economic strategy as an explicitly political gesture. 
It was the centrepiece of the famous Social Contract with the labour unions by 
which the government would control price increases and the trades unions 
would, in turn restrain wage demands.  
 
Import restrictions were perhaps the most controversial element in the AES 
package.  These ‘temporary’ measures were meant to satisfy two goals 
simultaneously.  On the one hand, it was hoped that they would help mitigate 
the ‘stop-go’ cycle – reflationary policies would no longer be brought to a halt 
by a rapid deterioration in the balance of payments due to the ‘sucking in’ of 
imports.  The other justification for import controls, however, brings into 
question what we shall see is a key premise on which the whole AES was 
constructed – the growing pervasiveness of monopoly in the economy.  If the 
monopoly power of British firms was growing in this period, why was it 
necessary to use import controls as part of a long term strategy for the 
recovery of British industry to give it ‘breathing space’ from ever more 
destructive international competition?  
 
Industrial democracy, i.e. forms of worker participation in firm decision making 
were to be introduced for their own sake, but it was also hoped that its 
introduction, by reducing worker alienation, would reinforce the other reforms 
designed to re-energise British industry. The introduction of elements of 
worker participation in the AES programme was the only aspect which in any 
way could be described as left wing or progressive: nationalisation was only 
proposed to take place in the context of full compensation to owners, and I am 
not aware of any left opposition to this notion5.  Thus, the AES, for all its left 
wing rhetoric, was largely concerned with the claim that it could improve the 
management of the business sector in Britain through extensive government 
participation and direction. 
 
The economic context in which the AES was originally enunciated was one in 
which the British economy had experienced relative economic decline 
compared to other nations, but was not obviously in a situation of crisis.  In the 
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period since the Second World War, Britain’s rate of economic growth was 
consistently at the bottom of ‘league tables’ of major industrial nations, and by 
the 1970s standards of per capita income were being equalled or exceeded in 
a range of countries in the Common Market. But even these apparently low 
rates of growth were higher for Britain than for any other comparable period in 
the twentieth century in this ‘golden age’ of world capitalism ending in about 
1971. In absolute terms, material standards had vastly improved. With no 
clear trends present in either direction in the gap between rich and poor, living 
standards even for the poorest sections of society were rising. Unemployment 
was low by international and historical standards; inflation, until the oil price 
rises which emerged in the wake of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, was low 
enough to be considered more of an annoyance and an obstacle to 
macroeconomic expansion than a serious threat to economic stability.  Crises 
in the balance of payments leading to devaluation, though present in other 
nations, most notably the US in 1971, tended to be treated in Britain as 
national traumas and symbols of decline.  Lastly, British industry, which in the 
years immediately after the Second World War appeared as the only 
significant rival in the capitalist world to the US in a range of key traditional 
industries and ‘high tech’ sectors such as computers, was now finding it 
pushed aside by upstarts such as Japan.  The ‘natural’ process of de-
industrialisation inevitable in advanced economies as the relative shares of 
the economy shifted from manufacturing to the tertiary (‘services’) sector (or, 
Britain’s case, partially into the primary sector with oil being extracted from the 
North Sea beginning in 1980) was taking place at an inordinate rate6. The 
feeling in Britain that it was undergoing a period of decline was pervasive.7 
 
Thus the context in which the AES emerged might have appeared propitious, 
since the notion that Britain was in a state of decline was widespread. 
Pervasive as well was a national consciousness of Britain’s former magisterial 
greatness, so that the AES’s implicit assertion of the possibility of economic 
renewal thorough unilateral national action might well come across as 
plausible, where in most other nations of western Europe a multilateral context 
and a sense of the constraints of the international economy were emerging as 
the norm.  Furthermore, the measures proposed, with the exception of the 
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proposal for the introduction of elements of workers’ control were not 
inherently left wing. Why then was the AES unable to generate broad-based 
political support? 
 
The failure of the Labour Party AES in political terms is partially linked to the 
specific historical conditions which emerged in the mid 1970s. The rise in the 
price of oil precipitated an inflation so severe that a key element of the AES – 
the need for reflation - was seen to be inoperative, and a policy of price 
controls as part of a Social Contract simply broke down.  Equally inoperative 
was the notion that the profits of the ‘monopolists’ could be directed to better 
ends: a general acceptance emerged (based on the work of the two eminent 
members of the left opposition cited above) that there was a long term decline 
in the profitability of British industry which obviated the question of the 
redistribution of these profits to better ends.   
 
The AES also failed because of elements that were not specifically linked to 
specific historical conditions which emerged in the mid 1970s, such as the 
long term public perception that nationalisation in sectors such as steel and 
cars had been, in a host of ways, unsuccessful.  From a political perspective, 
Crosland and the ‘revisionists’ demonstrated political astuteness compared 
with the proponents of the AES. For Crosland, Keynsian macroeconomic 
management was within the domain of politicians, but he generally opposed 
the notion that political involvement, either through nationalisation or planning 
agreements, could be a vehicle for the improvement of the performance of the 
business sector.  As we shall see, his opponents on the Labour left suggested 
that his opposition to AES–style  micro-management of the economy by 
government was due to his ‘old fashioned’ views on the nature of the 
contemporary British economy.  There can be little doubt, however, that 
Crosland’s primary reason for opposing such policies was that government 
involvement in the business sector evoked little public sympathy.  
 
 
III The Alternative Economic Strategy: Theoretical Underpinnings  
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The weaknesses embodied in the AES do not obviate the fact that it 
represented an attempt to put forth a programme for the regeneration of the 
British economy which was underpinned by a coherent intellectual argument.  
By contrast, the programme of the mainstream Labour ‘right’ represented by 
Crosland’s Future of Socialism (1956) seemed to be little more than an 
eloquently worded version of on s’engage et puis on voit.  Not until several 
years into the Thatcher era could it be claimed that political actors were 
motivated by a set of doctrines of such intellectual clarity. 
 
The AES largely emerged from the tireless advocacy and theoretical work of 
Stuart Holland. His central work The Socialist Challenge (1975) dwarfs, in 
theoretical ambition and detail, any comparable work in the post war world 
from the Crosland ‘revisionist’ group or indeed any other assemblage within 
the Labour Party.  The theoretical ‘skeleton’ may be put forth in the following 
propositions, some only implicit in Holland’s work: 
 
 - There is a growing tendency towards monopoly in the British 
economy. 
 - The management of privately owned large firms can be readily 
replaced by state ownership, or supplemented with governmental directives.  
 - ‘Socialism in one country’ is a viable proposition. 
 - Questions surrounding the substructure of the ownership and control 
of industry have precedence over superstructural issues. 
 
 
I will address each of these propositions in turn: 
 
 There is a growing tendency towards monopoly in the British economy. 
 
This notion has been, in various forms, a central aspect of the left wing 
literature of the economics of the twentieth century.  What is distinctive in 
Holland is that he focuses only briefly on the traditional critique of monopoly 
power  – that powerful firms which dominate individual markets can exploit 
consumers.  Rather, for him, the word ‘monopoly’ is often used in a more 
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metaphorical, populist sense to connote very large, most commonly 
multinational firms.   He measures this phenomenon not by looking at levels of  
concentration in individual markets, but at aggregate concentration – the 
share of the 100 largest firms in the British manufacturing sector, which 
indeed grew substantially over the twentieth century.   
 
This process of the growing predominance of large firms is, however, as in 
John Kenneth Galbraith’s New Industrial State (1967), viewed as inevitable 
and emerging from the exigencies of modern technology: survival of the fittest 
dictates the prevalence of these giants in the contemporary world.  As in 
Galbraith, management and decision-making in these large firms has become 
separated from ownership.  These managers, substantially freed both from 
the constraints of traditional competitive forces and from the demands of 
shareholders, can exercise significant freedom of action in their decisions.     
 
For Holland, there are two main reasons to be concerned with the emergence 
of these giant, multinational firms.  First, their presence and behaviour limits 
national sovereignty: governments, especially potentially socialist 
governments, lose control over fiscal and monetary policy, as well as foreign 
exchange when large, multinational firms pursue tactics to avoid the effects of 
governmental controls and taxation. The second reason to be concerned with 
the growth of the predominance of these large firms is that their monopoly 
power worsens the trade off between unemployment and inflation: 
governmental attempts to lower unemployment through additional expenditure 
will be thwarted by the ability of the monopolies to use their market power to 
put up prices.  This first proposition contains the essence of Holland’s world-
view.  It also embodies his critique of Crosland’s notion that it is more or less 
possible to leave governmental policy to the realm of macroeconomic (i.e. 
monetary and fiscal) policy, and let the business sector ‘take care of itself: for 
Holland, the emergent ‘mesoeconomic’ economy dominated by large, 
multinational firms makes such an approach impracticable, if not impossible.   
 
The very premise of the first proposition was false8.  The problems being 
experienced by British industry were not those of growing monopoly 
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predominance, but of increasing international competition and relative decline.  
In the immediate post war world, key elements of British industry cultivated 
habits of monopolistic sluggishness because of their substantial control over 
domestic and Commonwealth markets and the scarcity of international rivals.   
Progressively, British firms had to face unprecedented competition first from 
Continental rivals, and then from Japan, Asia and other nations. The high 
levels and rapid rise in aggregate concentration in the UK was largely a 
manifestation of its stagnation in the context of increasing international 
competition and a shrinking industrial base. Mergers in the UK accounted for 
much of the rise in concentration: managers, with poor prospects for the 
investment of funds in their own companies, chose to take over other firms 
than to pay dividends to shareholders. For a host of national economies that 
grew far more rapidly than the UK such as Italy, the small firm sector has 
been a key element in its rapid economic growth, putting the lie to the notion 
that giganticism was an inherent and inexorable part of all modern forms of 
capitalist development. 
  
The conclusions deduced from the first proposition may also be questioned9.   
It is certainly true that the emergence of giant multinational firms limits 
national sovereignty: governments, especially potentially socialist 
governments lose control over fiscal and monetary policy, as well as foreign 
exchange when large, multinational firms pursue tactics to avoid the effects of 
governmental controls and taxation. However, to paraphrase Mae West, we 
may note that monopoly has nothing to do with it10.  It is rather the growing 
preponderance of the international dimension in every nation’s economy – the 
dramatic rises in the flows of direct and portfolio investment, international 
trade and finance which are critical to the thwarting of national sovereignty, 
not any monopoly power on the part of firms per se. Very large firms in a 
competitive environment  (in, perhaps, an international context) would be at 
least as eager as any monopolist to avoid governmental controls and taxation.  
To the extent that the emergence of the multinational is, as we shall see 
below, an aspect of a more generalised internationalisation of the economic 
environment, it is a fact to be faced by all nations and has little to do with 
monopoly per se.  As Holland correctly points out, Britain has an exceptionally 
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large presence of multinational activity: if regulation of this mesoeconomic 
power is deemed necessary, all the more reason to look for it at the supra-
national level, rather than rely on the limited resources of a nation state.  
 
The second reason mesoeconomic power is said to be a problem is the 
worsening of the trade-off between unemployment and inflation.  It is indeed 
true that monopoly power can sometimes cause the price system to act 
perversely – in a notorious case in the US, the American Tobacco Company 
was able to raise cigarette prices in the context of general deflation during the 
Great Depression of the 1930s.  But in general, the notion does not even 
make logical sense: why should a monopolist’s pricing policy exacerbate 
inflation, which is the rate of change of prices?  There is indeed one case 
where a monopolist’s pricing policy might exacerbate inflation: when the 
monopolist, unlike the competitive firm, finds the easiest way to a ‘quiet life’ is 
to pass on cost increases generated by trades union demands to consumers 
through price increases. This particular case was not one likely to be 
emphasised by Holland or the Labour Party. 
 
 
 The management of privately owned large firms can be readily 
replaced by state ownership, or supplemented with governmental directives.  
 
The transition from capitalist to socialist direction is a smooth one in Holland’s 
Galbraithian world (we note the continuity here with the socialist tradition 
dating back to Engels)11.  In such a world, where technology dictates that it is 
the big firms that are the harbingers of the emergent ‘new industrial state’, it is 
sufficient to focus on this small number of large entities rather than the sea of 
enterprises in the economy as a whole. And since the managers of these 
large capitalist firms have substantial freedom of action due to monopoly 
power and their independence from shareholder demands, the re-direction of 
the large firm’s activities in a socialist direction will be a straightforward 
process. Ownership per se it not a critical issue: company managers as 
specialists can be left to deal with day to day decisions, but now the overall 
directives will be set by socialist planners. 
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In the post 1945 context, transfer of ownership from the private to public 
ownership was unproblematic in sectors that lent themselves to central 
direction (rail), where there were instances of ‘market failure’ in terms of 
redundant capacity and barriers to exit (coal) or when the service involved had 
significant ‘public good’ aspects (the Bank of England).  But in a range of 
other activities such as cars and steel, nationalised sectors – usually 
administered by the same individuals as in the pre-nationalised days, run into 
fundamental difficulties, rooted in an inadequate conceptualisation of the 
notion of competitive behaviour.  
 
This failure to understand competitive processes can be observed as well in 
the AES, where, as noted above, price restraint by the nationalised firm was 
to be a key policy tool in the creation of a ‘competitive atmosphere’ for the rest 
of the firms in the sector.  This identification of pricing policy with competitive 
behaviour is, of course, familiar from standard economics textbooks. The AES 
policy for creating a ‘competitive atmosphere’ had its likely genesis in the 
ideas of the socialist economist Oskar Lange in the 1930s. He suggested that 
the question of ownership is irrelevant in determining whether or nor an 
economy is efficient: a publicly owned, socialist economy could simulate the 
efficiency of a competitive capitalist economy by being instructed to set its 
prices in a competitive manner. 
 
Orthodox economists were quite flummoxed by this argument: how could 
private ownership be defended when competitive prices could just as well be 
simulated in a socialist context?  It took Fredrich Hayek, in this period quite a 
distaff figure in economics, to come to the aid of capitalism.  Competition 
under capitalism was, according to Hayek, about much more than pricing 
policy.  It involved (following Marx), a continual renewal of the forces of 
production, risk taking and the introduction of new technology12. Thus, while it 
is reasonable to think that telephone services, like those for water, can be 
straightforwardly provided by a single nationalised producer, the issue takes on 
a new light once the telephone sector is transformed into telecommunications.  
As a nationalised industry, we would have to answer the question – how much 
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of the public’s money should be invested (risked) in the new goods and services 
being offered by the telecommunications industry and in what new sectors 
should it be invested?  The presumption is, of course, that under capitalism, 
these questions are simply answered: in a privately owned firm, by virtue of 
holding the firm’s shares, the owners have acquiesced to partake in the risks 
embodied in new ventures.  Investments on the part of the firm will proceed as 
long as they are perceived to add to the value of the firm and therefore the net 
worth of the shareholder.  
 
This capitalist decision rule on investment is perfectly coherent. There is no 
equivalently coherent rule in a nationalised context. Let us concede that when 
the AES speaks of the need for ‘more’ investment in industry, it is implicitly 
invoking a Keynsian criterion whereby aggregate investment must be at a 
sufficient level to underpin full employment. The question still remains: 
investment in what? Would massive expenditure on capacity in the 1970s and 
1980s in the car and steel industries (likely ‘key’ sectors for expansion under 
the AES) have been of long run benefit to the British economy? The spectre of 
massive, Soviet style investment in obsolescent spheres of investment must 
be coupled with the extraordinarily detailed planning agreements discussed 
above, covering all aspects of firm behaviour.  Besides the obvious costs of 
administering any such agreements, the multiplicity of goals to be met 
promised to generate for the economy as a whole the kind of incoherence and 
lack of direction characteristic of nationalised industries13.  
 
Furthermore, the viability of the AES programme of planning agreements is 
linked to a particular view of the modern, large firm, also derived from 
Galbraith (1967), in which large companies are already self-sufficient islands 
of planning.  For the AES, then, it would be relatively unproblematic to 
introduce government-directed planning agreements with dozens of large 
firms as a replacement for existing firm-based planning procedures.  But in 
reality, for even the largest firms, trade with other firms appears to account for 
about 75% of sales14.  Meaningful planning agreements would then involve 
not only a firm-by-firm determination, but a morass of calculations concerning 
the interactions between firms. 
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The above few paragraphs could, indeed have been written by any paid-up 
member of Mrs Thatcher’s favourite think tank, the IEA.  But to observers in 
the early twenty-first century, the AES programme for the regeneration of 
British industry involving nationalisation and dozens of detailed planning 
agreements with firms evokes not so much a right wing hostility as a form of 
incredulity – how could anyone have believed in such a thing? It would be a 
shame if the incredulity evoked in response to the AES programme were to 
generate an uncritical attitude to the rationality of investment in a capitalist 
economy.  That problems exist in a Keynsian, macroeconomic, context are 
well known.  But even in the area of microeconomic decision making, where it 
was suggested above that capitalist investment appraisal is so rational, there 
are real problems.  Of the five ‘leading edge’ sectors of the supposed free 
enterprise US economy in the post war world, three of them  – electronics, 
telecommunications (including the Internet) and aircraft manufacture were 
created by having government money `thrown at them' during the Cold War15; 
agriculture has received massive governmental subsidies for generations.  Only 
the entertainment industry has emerged through the textbook route of private 
risk taking.  There are thus good reasons, even in a strictly business context, to 
question the unadorned efficacy of the free market as a vehicle for long term 
investment and development, even in the context of that supposed bastion of 
free enterprise, the US. But considered criticisms of free enterprise investment 
lose their force when the alternative in front of the public is AES-directed 
nationalisation and its morass of planning agreements.  
 
 ‘Socialism in one country’ is a viable proposition. 
 
It is perhaps unsurprising that nations with a great imperial history will view 
the growing internationalisation of the economy mainly as an imposition upon 
national sovereignty and a threat, rather than as an emerging, inevitable 
aspect of world economic development and a new set of opportunities for 
development.   For Holland, the multinational appears out of nowhere – like 
the monolith in 2001 – A Space Odyssey, and serves little purpose but to 
thwart socialist management of the economy.  In fact, the multinational is not 
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a peculiar imposition upon the world economy but a by-product of a more 
general economic internationalisation involving trade, finance and 
international dealings of all kinds which continues to this day.  Western 
Europe and the Common Market, as it was then known, are treated as 
problems to be coped with rather than as potential allies in trying to tame 
international capital.   This strikingly national perspective is certainly curious in 
the context of socialist intellectual tradition, but what is more apposite from the 
economistic perspective taken here is the gross underestimation of the 
momentum behind this process of economic internationalisation.  Within a few 
years of the publication of Holland’s book, all attempts to control exchange 
rates and currency movements level were to disappear within major capitalist 
economies.    
 
Britain did indeed have peculiar problems in an international context.  
Historically, Britain’s own economic development may well have been 
disadvantaged by the Empire oriented emphasis on overseas investment16. In 
Britain in the 1970s there was indeed a net outflow of foreign direct 
investment funds, and part of the AES strategy was a set of governmental 
measures to control outflows. Given the likely incentive effects of this and 
other aspects of the AES on potential inflows, its prospects for improving net 
inflow were clearly dubious. Britain was simply not powerful enough to cause 
international capital flows to bend to its will.  Proceeding more logically, Mrs 
Thatcher made brilliant use of bellicose patriotic rhetoric as a cover for 
policies that implicitly conceded Britain’s ordinary status in the world economy. 
At enormous cost to the domestic economy, her administration created an 
environment of ‘sound money’ and broken trades unions that acceded to the 
needs of international capital and made Britain a ‘first port of call’ for foreign 
direct investment in Europe by the late 1980s17.      
 
 
The last proposition listed above concerns the relationship between the 
substructure and superstructure.  The notion that this proposition is a valid 
one is shared by both radical supporters and opponents of the AES, and is a 
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key source of weakness for all of them.  We will therefore save dealing with it 
until we consider the reaction of the radical opposition to the AES.   
 
 
IV The Alternative Economic Strategy: the Radical Critics 
 
Responses to the AES ranged from those, such as the ‘left Kenysians’ who 
emphasised the need for reflation but without the AES’s plans for detailed 
intervention in industry to radical rejectionists for whom the AES was 
inadequate because far too timid.  We cannot do justice to the full range of 
views here,18 but the main lines of response by radical economists can be 
summarised without undue length. 
  
Support for the AES comes across most straightforwardly from those whose 
economic world-view emerges from the Galbraithian new industrial 
state/monopoly capital view which also informed the work of Stuart Holland.  
For these individuals, conditions are propitious for the implementation of 
socialism, even in a single country.  Britain is already dominated by large, 
relatively self-contained, planned entities – the great ‘monopolies’.  The 
transition to government directed planning in this context could, in an 
administrative sense, proceed without difficulty.  The main obstacle is political: 
the antagonism of international capital.       
 
A key organisation, which embraced many activists and academics who were 
otherwise unaffiliated with radical groups was the Conference of Socialist 
Economists (CSE). Their proposals were along  similar lines to those in the 
AES, but if anything more radical in their commitment to ‘socialism in one 
country’19.  The programme of the CSE  embodies an elaborate programme of 
import controls as part of a system of ‘planned trade’, including a reversal of 
the abolition of exchange controls (pp.86-102;111). (Holland opposed import 
controls, and they were introduced into the AES somewhat as an 
afterthought.) The ‘EEC’ is mentioned solely as a constraint on the 
implementation of this programme. 
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What is really distinctive about the CSE programme is its willingness to have a 
socialist Britain wage war on international capital. Thus, how will planning 
agreements be implemented in the context of the likely hostility of the large, 
internationally oriented firms? ‘ [If] capitalists refuse to buy government debt 
and shift their capital overseas...this opposition could be overcome… provided 
the workforce of the companies involved were committed to its 
implementation’ (p.71).  Furthermore, in the CSE programme MNEs would be 
subject to forms of greater democratic control than are envisaged for non-
multinational companies:  ‘That a government implementing a socialist 
economic strategy would be in a weak bargaining position cannot be doubted.  
The multinationals have at their command the control of financial resources, 
often the monopoly of technology, and probably can count on the backing of a 
significant section of their workforce, particularly those in management roles.  
It is a problem that can only be solved by mobilising all the sanctions and 
incentives available’ (p.108). 
 
By comparison, support for the AES from the distinguished theorist of  
monopoly capital, Sam Aaronovitch is of a less heady kind, but is equally  
strong in its nation-state orientation.  He castigates ‘….the fantasies of most 
leftist groups …that even breaking through in one country would be in 
sufficient to start building socialism…Radical change in one country will 
influence the climate in which other countries operate, but the focus of 
democratic struggle within each country is bound to be its own nation-
state’20(pp.113-114).   His most decisive break with the Labour AES 
programme is the proposal for withdrawal from the ‘Common Market’ (pp.89-
95).  
 
We thus have a set of responses which consistent with the first part of the 
hypothesis put forth earlier on the dominant role of ideas in the formulation of 
policy.  We can see in the positive responses above to AES-type policies a 
clear link to the ‘monopoly capital’ theoretical world-view which would make 
such policies plausible21. 
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Perhaps the most exhaustive critique of the AES from the radical rejectionist 
perspective can be found in Glyn and Harrison (1980).  Their view of the 
underlying nature of the crisis in Britain is in marked contrast to the monopoly 
capital view: the precipitous decline in the profitability of British industry is 
partially due to the exceptional level of conflict between labour and industry22.  
However, they also describe, as was done above in this paper, the post war 
transition between a Britain secure in its exports to the Sterling  area to one 
faced by international competition of all kinds. In somewhat Aesopian 
language, an important aspect of the British crisis is the increasing openness 
and competitive nature of the economic environment faced by Britain. In such 
circumstances, it is not surprising that they conclude that the AES is ‘…fatally 
flawed because it could surmount problems in the production of surplus value 
only by measures unacceptable to capital.  Capitalists would resist 
immediately it started to bite, and could cause massive disruption because the 
bulk of production would remain under their control’ (p.164).  The solution is 
one which is logically consistent with their view of the present state of British 
and world capitalism: there can be no half measures – only radical and 
complete socialisation of the British economy, one involving inevitable 
confrontation with international capital, can offer a coherent alternative to 
capitalism23. 
 
Support for the AES from Bob Rowthorn24 is somewhat surprising in the 
context of the schema outlined above, since he has never been identified with 
the monopoly capital approach to industrial analysis and has always 
emphasised Britain’s interdependency with other nations25.  Indeed, his major 
reservation with the AES is that ‘…the economies of Western Europe are now 
highly interdependent, and their problems cannot be completely solved by 
each country acting isolation from the rest. Some form of cooperation is 
completely necessary’ (p.8). Interdependency between nations, however, 
cannot be taken as an excuse to do nothing26.  Even though the policies of the 
AES are likely to excite international antagonism, they should be supported as 
part of a longer term strategy for the transformation of the economy and 
society in a socialist direction. 
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The fortunes of the two parts of the hypothesis whose validity this paper has 
set out to demonstrate have had divergent fortunes. The first part has had a 
modest success: it suggests that practical policies have behind them an 
intellectual framework which acts as the logical basis upon which these 
policies are formulated.  This ‘model’ has worked well for Stuart Holland and a 
host of supporters of the AES approach to radical change: in a world already 
evolving under capitalism towards the hegemony of a few large 
bureaucratically administered monopolies, the introduction of governmental 
ownership and direction should be a straightforward affair, especially in a 
nation such as Britain which is conspicuously dominated by such entities.  
This part of the hypothesis has also been validated in the case of the radical 
rejectionists, whose opposition to the AES is at least in part based on their 
failure to embrace the monopoly capital world view.  But it has failed in the 
case of Rowthorn, whose support for the AES is almost completely motivated 
by a desire for the political revitalisation of the left in Britain, with the economic 
logic left unclear. 
 
The second part of the hypothesis above is that correct ideas will lead to 
policies that succeed, while incorrect ideas will generate policies that fail.   
This notion, one must admit, appears to be rejected by the evidence: all 
policies of the left intellectual opposition, whether they be for moderate 
‘Keynsian’ direction of the economy, support for the AES, or radical and 
complete socialisation of the economy have failed to have any impact in 
Britain to the present moment, and there appears little reason to believe that 
this situation is likely to change in the near future.   
 
But as the reader might have guessed, an attempt will be made here to 
salvage this second part of the hypothesis.  One way of dealing with this dead 
end for the left is to suggest that all these failed policies – those of the AES, 
as well as those of its radical supporters and critics - share a dubious 
theoretical presumption, the last of the Holland/AES propositions mentioned 
above:  
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Questions surrounding the substructure of the ownership and control of 
industry have precedence over superstructural issues. 
 
For generations, the left has focused on the need for a radical restructuring in 
the ownership and control of industry as the fundament of social change. I 
have contested this notion elsewhere: 
 
…the dominant tradition emanating from [Marxism] has 
concentrated on the importance of changes in the economic 
base of society as the mechanism through which it would then 
be possible to deal with questions of human development. 
Superstructural issues such as education have been 
perceived as secondary. This tradition is dominant despite the 
fact that it was precisely failures in aspects of the 
‘superstructure’ that motivated many individuals’ radical 
activity in the first place-individuals for whom superstructural 
work such as education was often the dominant mode of 
human and professional activity (I use this awkward phrase to 
embody not only teachers, but parents as well.) We can see 
the extreme manifestations of this phenomenon in the 
example of the Trotskyist, by profession a teacher, who 
decides to go off and do some ‘real’ political activity by 
working and organising in a factory; or in the mutual 
incomprehension evidenced when a right-winger decides, with 
a degree of logic, that the concentration of left-wingers on 
strictly economic forms of inequality must be linked to the 
politics of envy’ – why else would there be such an obsessive 
focus on the ownership of property and on income statistics?   
 
This ‘Marxist’, materialist determinist approach to the radical 
transformation of society has debilitated the politics of the Left 
and has mystified potential supporters. Much of the Left’s 
energy has been dissipated by industrial experiments in 
planning.  Individuals were distracted and social development 
was cramped.  Perhaps history should not be second 
guessed, but it seems indisputable now that had the 1945 
Labour government concentrated on rewriting the 1944 
Education Act and reconstructing the university system, a 
genuine and lasting transformation of the society might well 
have been possible.  I would go further: a true cultural 
revolution among the population might have created the 
prerequisites for a transformation in the industrial environment 
in which genuine elements of industrial democracy – 
democratic socialism – were present.27  
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Even for Marx, where the idea of the dominant role of the substructure 
supposedly originates, the ‘mode of production’ encompasses much more 
than just the ownership and control of the means of production. Properly 
defined it includes many elements usually identified with the ‘superstructure’ 
of society.  Much of the failure of the left opposition was its choice to fight its 
battles in the wrong domain. 
 
Let us take a concrete example to demonstrate this point.  It has been noted 
that a fair percentage of the left opposition was made up of individuals who, 
directly or indirectly, were involved in education.  Many of the individuals 
discussed here were, in fact, academics involved in the teaching of economics 
in institutions of higher education, either universities or, as they were then, 
polytechnics.  While much of this left opposition in the 1970s and 1980s was 
engaged in what turned out to be fruitless discussions about the restructuring 
of industry, a revolution was taking place right under their feet – a vast 
expansion of business school education in the UK, modelled on the system in 
place in the US.   
 
As David Noble (1977) has pointed out, the emergence of the business school 
in the US in the early part of the twentieth century was not merely a device for 
the imparting of technical knowledge to a group of individuals.  A central role 
played by these business schools was the creation of a self-conscious class 
of individuals aware of their role in society and within the firm.  Class 
differentiation and an awareness on the part of graduates that they were to be 
part of ‘management’ and not mere employees were vital aspects of what was 
being inculcated in the business schools. 
 
In the contemporary world, only business graduates from the most elite 
institutions are likely to think of themselves as part of a ruling stratum.  With 
present day mass recruitment of students into business schools in the US, we 
see the social role of the business school greatly expanded: it is now perhaps 
the key vehicle for the dissemination of the business ethos in society, the 
realisation of the 1920s slogan that ‘America’s business is Business’.  What 
this seemingly redundant phrase means in practice is that the business school 
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is the institution which establishes the norms of economic discourse in 
society.  We now see a similar development in Britain.  Thus, while debates 
may rage among academics about the causes of present day difficulties in the 
German economy, the general public is simply informed, on the business 
section of the morning news on radio, of the ‘need’ for Germany to restructure 
its welfare system and make its labour markets more ‘flexible’.   
 
The left opposition has permitted the creation of a generation of decision 
makers, educated in business schools, whose perspective on the economy 
and society emanates from the calculus of profit.  It is no wonder that 
business schools have had to improvise courses on ‘ethics’ and ‘social 
responsibility’ when so much power is in their hands.  Economists and other 
intellectuals may debate changes in society in the pages of the Guardian, but 
the people making these changes are business school graduates reading (at 
best) the Financial Times. With the best will in the world, no business degree 
in Britain can introduce broader considerations into their programmes in any 
way other than as an appendage.  We can now say: ‘Britain’s business is 
Business’. In only a few decades, this dramatic change in the structure of 
higher education has dictated that the norms, ‘needs’ and even language of 
business has emerged as the discourse in which key social decision are 
made.  Broader social considerations may be discussed among the academic, 
left wing ‘chattering classes’, but real decisions are made elsewhere. 
 
If the attention of the left opposition had not been directed at fruitless attempts 
to reorganise the whole industrial structure, might not things have come out 
differently?   Instead of American style business courses, British academics, 
most especially those on the left, could have asserted the necessity for the 
putative decision makers of the future to receive a broad based academic 
education.  They could have developed, in an imaginative way, applied 
economics courses in which the substantive technical material of a business 
degree was integrated with a programme that discussed these matters in an 
historical, social and political perspective.  Needless to say, academic 
economists, on their side would have benefited from being forced to consider, 
at close proximity, the real world problems of reading and interpreting a 
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company’s annual report, and not just coping with the latest fashion in game-
theoretic modelling.  If the creation of alternatives to business school courses 
seems mundane compared to revolutionising the industrial structure, I will 
simply note that it was a good deal more feasible.  
 
 
 
V Conclusions 
 
The AES and the responses to it of the left intellectual opposition encapsulate 
many of the failures of the left that have lead to its demise in Britain.  Much of 
the left stayed wedded to the theory of monopoly capital because of the ready 
appeal involved in uniting ‘ordinary’ people in the fight against the ‘big 
monopolists’.  But when acted upon as a basis for public policy, as in the AES, 
this theory was so at variance with the realities of economic life that it finally 
ended in disarray.  Some radical economists had more realistic views on the 
emerging trends in the world economy.  But they often proposed solutions of a 
speculative, utopian kind that did not emerge ‘out of the womb’ (Marx’s 
phrase) of the economic realities and trajectories they had correctly analysed. 
Their solutions, furthermore, were likely to result in levels of social and 
political confrontation, national and international, that the public was 
completely unwilling to support. 
 
The suggestion made here is that more attention should have, and should be 
directed by the left to so-called superstructural aspects of society than has 
been the case heretofore.  In education at all levels, for instance, the 
prospects for successful intervention are much higher, and more immediate, 
than they are in areas governing the fundamental ‘relations of production’.  Is 
it being suggested here, then, that the latter issues must be abandoned to the 
‘logic of the market place’?   
 
On the contrary, correct policies can only be formulated once there is an 
appropriate understanding of the disposition and trajectory of the 
contemporary economy.  In a world economy which in general grows 
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increasingly competitive, to cry ‘monopoly capital’ on a regular basis is to 
evoke the same response as that given to the boy who cried ‘wolf’.  In sectors 
such as pharmaceuticals, however, firms possess enormous market power 
and use it to exploit consumers, most especially those in the poorest 
countries. Strict discipline must, and can be imposed on these highly 
profitable companies, with regulation necessarily taking place at an 
international level, given the multinational functioning of these entities.  The 
claim that these firms will simply wither away and die under such discipline is 
nonsense.   
 
In general terms, policies for economic change will have to be constructed 
that go ‘with the grain’ of emerging economic realities.  Those realities, as far 
as I can see, signal a further intensification of trends which have already taken 
place.  Thus, a recent article in Business Week looks at the consequences of 
the latest developments in the ‘outsourcing’ of jobs from rich to poor countries.  
We have become used to this process in the context of manufacturing 
employment, but this article is considering the implications of an intensifying 
movement of ‘white collar’ and professional employment from rich countries to 
India, China and other countries.  I find myself concurring with Business 
Week’s editorial on the matter, which suggests that the appropriate response 
of rich countries (in this case the US) is not for them to close in on 
themselves, but to respond to these challenges by improving their own 
education systems.28   
 
There is much work for radical analysts to do in this area: why have rich 
countries found it so difficult to respond in this ‘obvious’ way to the emerging 
challenges of an ever more internationalised economy?  What forms are an 
‘improved’ educational system likely to take in the present political and social 
climate, and what kinds of change would be socially desirable?  (Radical 
responses to the latter question are not likely to coincide with those of the 
editorial writers of Business Week.)  Elaborate programmes to complement 
educational improvements would be imperative in rich countries in the context 
of these developments in the international economy.  Such programmes 
would include the long term planning and coordination of human capital needs 
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within various sectors of the national economy and policies to reduce the 
wastage of human resources generated by social stratification.  Such major 
efforts, if undertaken seriously, are likely to necessitate a significant 
redirection of resources away from luxury consumption and other forms of 
gratuitous expenditure.  Radical policy proposals of this nature might well 
have a potent and successful political impact when they emerge in response 
to the actual trajectory of current realities.  The real struggle may then just 
begin: to assure that these ‘radical’ proposals have not lost sight of the initial 
left opposition vision of human liberation and development.  
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1 See as well Armstrong et al. (1991). 
 
.2 ‘Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic 
scribbler of a few years back.  I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated 
compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas’ (Keynes, 1936, p.383). 
 
3 Auerbach et al. (1988).  
 
4 The exposition here of the AES programme owes a good deal to Wickham-Jones (1994), especially 
chapter 3. 
 
5 AES supporters and radical commentators were generally in favour of wealth redistribution, but not 
by way of nationalisation per se. 
 
6 See Rowthorn and Wells (1987). 
 
7 See (Tomlinson, 1996).  
 
8 The economic argument here follows from Auerbach (1988). 
 
9 Pedantic readers may wish to object that in logic, a false premise will always result in true 
propositions, i.e. if  premise p is false, than both  
 
p   q    and  p    q   
 
will necessarily be true. 
 
10 For those with inadequacies in their knowledge of the culture of the Empire, we offer the following 
explanation: ‘My goodness, Miss West, what beautiful diamonds you’re wearing!’ She replied ‘Honey, 
goodness had nothing to do with it’.  
 
11 See Auerbach, et al. (1988).  
 
12 See Lavoie (1988).  The common identification of Marx’s ideas with notions of the inevitable emergence 
of monopoly is based on some passing comments in the (unpublished) third volume of Capital  Such an 
identification is as appropriate as an exclusive focus on Issac Newton’s continuing belief in miracles and 
divine intervention in a consideration of his work on the laws of gravity. 
 
13 See Rees (1976). 
 
14
 See Auerbach (1992b) and De Grauwe and Camerman (2003). 
 
15 See, for example, Leslie (1993). 
 
16 See Cain and Hopkins (1993). 
 
17 See Ietto-Gillies (1993).  
 
18  Surveys can be found in Aaronovitch et al. (1981), pp.374 – 81 and Wickham-Jones (1994), pp. 
521-532. 
 
19 Conference of Socialist Economists London Working Group (1980), chapters 2 and 3 indicates a 
standard monopoly capital approach, but unlike Holland and the AES they do not think that lack of 
competition is a problem in most industries (p.72).  Page numbers below refer to this book. 
 
20 Sam Aaronovitch (1981), pp.113-114.  Page numbers below refer to this book. 
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21 From a later period, we can find a much more cautious approach being pursued by leading theorists 
of monopoly capital to industrial strategy, including the prospect of cooperation with the European 
Community: (Cowling and Sugden,1993).  This may be contrasted with the bolder approach implied in 
Cowling (1982), pp.173-177.  
 
22  See Glyn and Sutcliffe (1972). 
 
23 Bob Sutcliffe may also be associated at that time with this position (personal communication). 
 
24 Rowthorn (1981). Page numbers below refer to this article. 
 
25 See Rowthorn and Wells (1987). 
 
26 See Rowthorn (1974). 
 
27 Auerbach (1992a), pp.9-10. Footnote omitted. 
 
28 Business Week (2003), and the editorial on p.100. 
 
